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Kokoda |
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The rapid success of the Japanese invasions commenced in late December 1941 had even surprised Japan's military planners and by 8 March after Japanese forces had secured a foothold on New Guinea, it was necessary to pause and take stock of their gains so far. Strategically, occupation of New Guinea and Papua as well as New Caledonia, Fiji and islands further south would increase the depth of the Japanese defensive perimeter in the South West Pacific as well as severing communications between Australia and the United States. The Defence of Moresby In late April 1942, as part of a strike against multiple Allied locations, an invasion force destined for Port Moresby departed Rabaul. Thanks to the code-breaking system ULTRA the United States were privy to Japan's operational plans and able to pre deploy to counter the Japanese invasion flotilla. Following the subsequent Battle of the Coral Sea, Port Moresby received its fist respite when the Japanese abandoned their plans and returned to Rabaul. Following this setback the Japanese decided on a combined drive on Port Moresby. A force would move from Buna and Gona on New Guinea's north coast to cross the Owen Stanley Ranges and strike at Port Moresby. At the same time an amphibious force was to land on the eastern tip of Papua at Milne Bay and move along the coast to attack Port Moresby from the east. Unbeknown to the Japanese Milne Bay, however, was occupied by the Allies and their attack was foiled. The Japanese advance over the Owen Stanley's proved much more successful than that against Milne Bay. It had been the belief of the Allied command that the Japanese were only interested in securing the airfields in the north rather than Port Moresby. Furthermore, it was thought the mountainous terrain and solitary track (Kokoda) that linked Gona in the north with Port Moresby in the south was impassable to any large invading force. The track passed through the village of Kokoda and it was thought that a small detachment could hold up a larger force in the narrow confines of an imagined Kokoda Gap. Landing at Gona on the 21st July, The Japanese force began to move south immediately. A rifle company of Australians marched from Moresby to Kokoda to counter any intended Japanese thrust and was later joined by a single platoon of the raw 39th (Militia) Battalion that was flown from Moresby to the small airfield at Kokoda. On 29 July after a bitter fight the Japanese secured the airfield. In late August they began to push beyond Kokoda. Elements of the 53rd Battalion had joined the 39th Battalion reinforcements and after several counterattacks could not contain the Japanese advance and fell back. Two battalions of the 21st Brigade AIF now joined the fray, the 2/14th and 2/16th. Despite enormous difficulties in regard to providing adequate supplies the units moved up the track. The 2/14th joined the beleaguered 39th Battalion in a stout defence of Isurava though one that was unable to stop the Japanese advance. Here Private Bruce Kingsbury of the 2/14th won a VC when he led a counterattack firing his Bren Gun to clear a path as he ran forward before being killed by a sniper. The 2/27th moved up to relieve the 2/14th and 2/16th but was attacked in the flank and driven from the track on 6 September (the day the Japanese base at Milne Bay was overrun). A new defensive line, however, was formed at Ioribaiwa by the 2/14th and 2/16th, which numbered only 307 fit men between them. They were relieved by the newly arrived 25th Brigade which, although driven from the position by a Japanese attack, was able to secure a stronger position a few miles south on Imita Ridge, just thirty miles above Port Moresby. The failure of the Milne Bay attack combined with the dogged resistance of the Australians and some poor planning by the Japanese commanders saw a crisis situation arise. The Japanese troops were starving, their higher commanders having sent ammunition rather than food forward as supplies. They also failed to utilise their planes to make food drops along the track. Unable to live off the land and with their supply routes also subject to effective US bombing the Japanese force quit its position at Ioribaiwa and commenced to withdraw. Australians advancing over the vacated positions encountered evidence of cannibalism. A clash with the Japanese rearguard occurred at Templeton's Crossing and on 2 November the airfield at Kokoda was recaptured. The Japanese then retreated to their coastal defences at Buna and Gona. The Australians lost 625 men killed and over a 1000 wounded in the fight for Kokoda plus many more through illness. A major controversy to arise from the advance on Port Moresby was the sacking of the Australian commander Major-General Sydney Rowell. MacArthur, as Supreme Allied Commander for the SWPA, was mortified at the possibility that Moresby might fall. His own reputation would be clearly tarnished should that happen. After making disparaging remarks about the Australians failure to halt the Japanese he pressured Prime Minister Curtin to send General Blamey to the front to take personal charge. Despite having visited only a week beforehand and having been satisfied with the Australian situation, Blamey returned on 23 September and after an acrimonious confrontation with Rowell, removed him from command. A second commander, General 'Tubby' Allen was relieved in November when MacArthur complained that the Australian advance was too slow! Both episodes revealed the extent to which the Australian government and military had submitted to American demands. Wau In September 1942, Japanese forces began moving inland from Lae with the intention of securing the strategically important airfield at Wau. The village was situated on the Bulolo River, thirty miles south west of Salamaua accessible only by air and rough mountain tracks. In March 1942, the 5th Independent Company and the New Guinea Rifle Volunteers, dubbed Kanga force, were sent to Wau to harass Japanese coastal garrisons. A lack of reinforcements and supply difficulties restricted the operations of this force. The failure along the Kokoda by the Japanese led to a renewed strategy to secure Port Moresby via Wau and Bulldog. On 31 August the Japanese occupied Mubo and began consolidating this position while increasing their force to three battalions. In mid-January the Japanese force advanced along an overgrown track through Wandumi and moved on Wau. Kanga force had been strengthened by the arrival of the 2/7th Independent Company but was still heavily outnumbered. Anticipating the Japanese attack, Blamey ordered the 17th Brigade from Milne Bay to reinforce Wau. Elements of the leading battalion of this brigade began to arrive on 13 January. Ten plane loads of the 2/6th arrived next day on the 19 January the remainder of the Battalion was flown in and took up position to block the Japanese advance via the Bulolo Valley. Two companies of the 2/5th began to arrive on 24 January. The balance of that unit plus the 2/7th were forced to return to Port Moresby on the 28 January in the face of bad weather. On that same day an advance company of the 2/6th under Captain W. Sherlock engaged a larger force at Wandumi. Sherlock's men were eventually overwhelmed but not before they had bought valuable time for the main defending force. The next morning the leading elements of the Japanese broke through the verge of the village and the airfield came under small arms and mortar attack. As the weather cleared the 2/5th and 2/7th were returned to Wau. Fifty-seven transport planes landed under fire during the course of the morning and the incoming troops were immediately siphoned into the battle. Fighting raged all day. The arrival of the 2/1st Field Artillery Regiment proved decisive and its guns tipped the balance. A counterattack by the 2/7th supported by artillery and air bombardment blunted the Japanese attack and the initiative passed into the Australians hands. After four more days fighting, casualties and lack of supplies conspired against the Japanese who retired to Mubo. Wau was used as a base of operations in the upcoming months against Salamaua and Lae and became a forward supply depot in the later campaigns of 1943. |
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